

**FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1986-87
(Part 5)**

**HEARINGS AND MARKUP
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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Mr. SOLARZ. Yes; I hope the people on the staff got that down, so we can follow up on it. But something along those lines?

Mr. SINGER. Exactly.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think anybody in Sri Lanka would notice?

Mr. HARRISON. If you put in the aid language that he suggested, they would.

Mr. SOLARZ. Because I'm sure there won't be too many people in Iowa or Brooklyn who notice. But you say there is a greater constituency for what we do over in Sri Lanka than over here?

Mr. SINGER. Very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK.

By the way, I just want to take note of the presence here of a number of new diplomats from a variety of Asian countries who recently arrived in Washington and have been brought in to observe our hearings.

I hope they don't go away with the wrong impression and send back cables that this American democracy isn't all that it's cracked up to be.

But at any rate, we are delighted to have them with us today.

Mr. LEACH. Would the gentleman yield on that?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes; I'd be happy to.

Mr. LEACH. I think it should be explained that on the House floor, the single most important bill that will ever be considered this year relating to aid to farmers is being considered, and that's one of the reasons attendance is light.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right.

Let me ask the gentleman on that point, does a Congressman from New York, with no farmers in his district, have an obligation to support this bill, given the extent to which representatives from the farm States voted for the legislation to save New York City from bankruptcy several years ago? [Laughter.]

Mr. LEACH. I don't think anyone would presume on anyone else's judgment, but we would think, that if one had a light of compassion in any part of one's soul, one would probably support it.

Mr. SOLARZ. OK. Well, there's no member for whom I have greater respect than my friend from Iowa. So if you say that this is a bill that I can support with a clean conscience, I certainly will take that into consideration.

ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE

Now, I gather, Professor Singer, you think the all-parties conference is dead.

Mr. SINGER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. And any solution which emerges will not come out of the context of the all-parties conference.

Mr. SINGER. I would doubt that it does. I think that all parties have to be brought into the solution, but the all-parties congress, as such, I think, is probably finished.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Harrison, can you briefly tell us what you consider to be the differences between the United States and the United Nations perspectives on Afghanistan?

You had some allusions to this in your testimony, and it wasn't quite clear to me what the differences are that you believe exist in our respective approaches.

Mr. HARRISON. The U.N. scenario has a limited objective—that is, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

The United States objective is to roll back Soviet influence from Afghanistan to the greatest extent possible. We haven't specified, but various people, including Leo Rose in the speech that I've put in the record speaking in behalf of the Government, have said that a Soviet client state would not be acceptable.

In general, that's the distinction. The distinction is that the United Nations, reflecting Pakistan's assessment at various times in these negotiations, has been that the most you can do is get the forces out, but you may end up with a very distasteful Soviet client state.

Mr. SOLARZ. But wait a second. If the minimum condition that everybody insists on is the withdrawal of Soviet forces, then isn't the subsequent question as to whether or not the regime in Kabul is a Soviet client or not in a certain sense completely academic? Once the Red army withdraws, it will be impossible to maintain a puppet government in Kabul.

So whether you are willing to accept it or not is, in a sense, it is irrelevant, because the Afghan people themselves will take care of that.

Mr. HARRISON. That's what the U.N. believes. Their scenario would leave it to the Afghans to work it out or fight it out.

But we're attempting to get this issue of the regime settled before the conclusion of a settlement. We want the replacement of the present regime to take place before the settlement is concluded.

The essence of the U.N. scenario is that the present Communist regime would be in place and the Russians would therefore have the face-saver that they have not abandoned their Communist revolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. But you create the impression that the United States is more of an obstacle to a political settlement in Afghanistan than the Soviet Union. I'm sure that's not your—

Mr. HARRISON. No, that's not my intent at all. I've simply said that we haven't tested whether the Soviets are willing to withdraw on the basis of the formula that they say they are willing to accept.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it true that the Soviets have so far refused to agree to a date certain for the withdrawal of all their forces?

Mr. HARRISON. Well, that's certainly one of the elements of an agreement that would have to come, and they haven't agreed to that; nor has the United States agreed to the things that are envisaged for it to do; nor has Pakistan agreed to the things—and all the sides are trying to put the monkey on the other side's back, and it would not be correct to put the major share of the blame, or rather the only share, on the Soviet Union; but certainly it would be ridiculous to suggest that the United States is responsible for the present impasse in the U.N. negotiations.

I was trying to point out that India's—in my testimony, I was talking about what India should be doing on Afghanistan, and what I was saying was that it can't play a role until we sort out the Pakistan problem.

CRANSTON AMENDMENT

Mr. SOLARZ. We spoke earlier about our interest in preventing the acquisition by Pakistan of nuclear weapons. Clearly, this is a major concern of our country, and most people seem to feel that, the denials of the Pakistani Government notwithstanding, they are continuing in their efforts to obtain at least the capacity to make a nuclear weapon if they should choose to do so.

Last year, Senator Cranston suggested that we adopt legislation which would cut military assistance to Pakistan if it were found to be developing a nuclear explosive device or procuring special nuclear materials such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which presumably would be necessary in order for them to explode a device.

Under current law, if Pakistan is developing a nuclear explosive device or procuring the special materials, it can still get the aid. They only lose the aid if they explode a device or if they actually produce a device and then transfer it to another country.

Would you think the adoption of the Cranston amendment would be useful or not? If so, why? If not, why not?

Mr. HARRISON. Sometimes in life, you can do the right thing for the wrong reasons.

I would be happy to see the Cranston amendment adopted, because I feel, for other, more compelling reasons, the United States should not be extending the type of military assistance to Pakistan it is extending.

I am disturbed at the whole notion of the United States, which is proliferating nuclear weapons right and left, approaching other sovereign countries with the objectives of nonproliferation that are grotesque in the context of what we are doing to proliferate nuclear weapons.

I want to see military aid to Pakistan reduced, and therefore I would be happy to see the Cranston amendment adopted, even though I think it's conceptually flawed.

Mr. LEACH [acting chairman]. When you refer to proliferation of nuclear weapons, do you mean building ourselves or giving them to others?

Mr. HARRISON. I mean we are adopting an essentially indefensible posture in saying that we're entitled to proliferate our own nuclear weapons but other people aren't.

Mr. LEACH. Increase is what you are referring to then.

Mr. HARRISON. Well, yes. I'm just playing on the words. It seems to me President Carter, in his campaign, made this point over and over again as a basis for his whole approach; he was going to couple nonproliferation—

Mr. LEACH. I'm a student of history. Which president was this?

Mr. HARRISON. We have to go back a long way, but it's Jimmy Carter. When he was campaigning, he talked in terms of bringing together—

Mr. LEACH. This is a new administration.

Mr. SINGER. I do want to jump in, if I may, Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Yes, of course.

Mr. SINGER. On the business of the aid issue, I think that the United States has a tremendous opportunity right now, with the change of regime in India.

Tragic as the events were that brought it about, I do not think that the perceptions of hostility that were there before on both sides are there right now, and I think that it's a golden opportunity that may not come again unless we make the most of it, and one of the ways of making the most of it would be to reduce the arms sales to Pakistan, which the Indians perceive as so threatening to themselves.

Mr. LEACH. Professor, let me just say, from all my contacts with Indians—and my contacts are very limited—it's my similar perception, too, that there's a great opportunity today and that's one of the reasons I stress that in the U.S. Congress there's nothing but a friendly attitude toward India.

Beyond that, there is a realpolitik concern for what is happening in Afghanistan. Based upon that Afghanistan issue, the United States certainly is going to maintain a military relationship with Pakistan.

Then there are questions of judgment on how far it should go. The only thing, I think, in terms of international politics, that we would ask of the Indians is to understand that we're not driven by an anti-Indian bent. Likewise, I think the Indians are going to make it clear to the United States that we must understand that some of these weapons could potentially be used against them, and that's a context we have to understand.

Given that series of contexts, it's my impression from the people I have talked to who have recently been in India, that there is a stunning opportunity with the new leadership in India, for closer relations with the United States, and that perhaps the Bhopal incident has not worked out to be as stunningly anti-American as some perceived it might become, and that we do have a signal opportunity.

It's sad, however, if the only way to reflect that opportunity is to reflect it in the manner of arms sales to Pakistan. I think there must be other techniques.

Mr. SINGER. Absolutely; this is only being discussed in the context of a foreign assistance bill, however.

Mr. LEACH. Sure.

Mr. SINGER. But there are many, many ways, and one of the *quid pro quos* that we might ask the Indians, it seems to me, is that if there were certain limitations placed on arms to Pakistan, what would India do to put pressure on the Russians on Afghanistan in return for that, and that does not seem to me to be something that's beyond the realm of the possible.

Mr. LEACH. But I think one could suggest that the Indians slightly change their public posture to be more assertive.

I don't think there is anyone who realistically thinks that if they did, it would change the Russian attitude to any serious extent so I think we have to be measured in our judgments on how important that shift in attitudes would be.

Mr. SINGER. I do think, though, Mr. Leach, that the Russians do not take lightly their ties with the Indians, and I think if they thought that they were jeopardizing those ties—I mean at a new

stage and in some new phase, if they saw the United States and India entering into a rapprochement, I think the Russians would be very concerned at not losing their credibility and their ties with the Indians and they might try to do some things.

Besides that, I truly believe the Russians would love to get out of Afghanistan if they could find a face-saving way to do it. I think the costs for them are beginning to mount to a point where they would love out; they just haven't figured out a way that they could do it yet.

Mr. LEACH. Well, the finest way is to follow the advice of the great American Senator. Was it Senator Aiken who said, "Declare victory and get out"?

Mr. SINGER. Aiken, who did prove to be right after all, didn't he?

Mr. SOLARZ. All they have to do is follow the example of General Westmoreland a week or two ago: Declare victory and get out also.

PAKISTANI RESPONSE

Just a few more questions.

Mr. Harrison, getting back to Senator Cranston's proposed amendment, which would require the cutoff of military assistance to Pakistan if it were developing a nuclear explosive device, if we were to adopt this, what do you think the impact on the Pakistani nuclear program would be?

Would they, in fact, stop it, not wanting to lose the aid, or would they continue anyway, thereby obligating us to cut off the aid?

Mr. HARRISON. It's not clear to me what the consequences would be.

I have problems with the Cranston amendment, because I think once you've made an aid commitment of this kind, you should follow through on it.

I don't think we can basically control what Pakistan does in its nuclear program, and that's why I have not addressed the issue in those terms. That's why I think we should be cutting military aid for other reasons, but if the Cranston amendment is the best way of doing it politically, fine.

Mr. SOLARZ. We'll accept that thought. Earlier you said that we should live up to the 5-year commitment, as it were, and at least for the next 2 years give them the aid that we promised.

The Cranston amendment might require us to terminate the aid before the 2 years are up.

Mr. HARRISON. Yes; I prefer the option I suggested, which was a conditionality with respect to the F-16 as nuclear-capable aircraft and a clear undertaking that they couldn't be used with nuclear weaponry.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right.

Now, what the Congress has done is to draw very clearly a line with respect to the explosion of a nuclear device. Any country which explodes a nuclear device loses its eligibility for U.S. assistance.

Let me ask you: In the context of the subcontinent, how significant a line is that? In other words, if Pakistan develops the capacity to make nuclear weapons, how much do we gain by not having them actually explode a device? Or, to put it differently, if they do

explode a device, what are the consequences and how serious are they?

Mr. HARRISON. Well, certainly in terms of Indian response, every evidence that they are serious and are pursuing a military nuclear capability will lead to more Indian nuclear development.

So, from that point of view, it would be the climax of a process in which India would either be tempted to take preemptive action or would certainly be putting more money into a real military nuclear buildup.

Mr. SOLARZ. So you would think it's useful then to prevent an explosion.

Mr. HARRISON. I think that it's useful to try to defuse tensions in the subcontinent, and, from that point of view, conventional weaponry is just as important as nuclear weaponry.

The provision of nuclear-capable aircraft has led India to escalate all of its military programs. You can't separate these things, and I feel that this preoccupation with the nuclear issue, per se, is unrealistic. The nuclear issue is a function of the military tensions between the two countries.

PAKISTANI DELIVERY CAPACITY

Mr. SOLARZ. Does Pakistan have the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons in any other way than through the F-16's?

Mr. HARRISON. I'm not equipped to answer that question from a technical point of view, but certainly the F-16 would augment any capabilities they could contrive otherwise.

UNESCO PROJECT

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, Professor Singer, you suggested that we give Sri Lanka \$250,000 for this cultural program that they were getting \$250,000 from UNESCO. Has UNESCO in effect, cut their contribution by \$250,000?

Mr. SINGER. My understanding is, it has.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you suggesting that we ought to give comparable sums of money to every country where UNESCO had projects that were cut by the amount the United States reduced its contribution to UNESCO, or just in the case of Sri Lanka?

Mr. SINGER. Not necessarily; no. Not across the board.

If UNESCO was involved in projects that we think are useful—and many of them were—then I think that we ought not to punish the countries that were receiving the American aid channeled through UNESCO simply because we did not like some of the other things UNESCO was doing, and in that sense I was suggesting that we go on and support the cultural triangle in Sri Lanka, and I am sure there are many other projects around the world that deserve support because they are important things that should be done.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is happening in terms of this particular project by virtue of the shortfall in funds? Has the project been brought to an end?

Mr. SINGER. My understanding is that it has been slowed terribly and is coming, if not to a total standstill, to a slow crawl. It was supported by tourism in some degree, and tourism has been hit badly.

Mr. SOLARZ. How important is this particular project?

Mr. SINGER. Interestingly enough, I think it's symbolically more important than one might think, because it illustrates the diversity and the unity of Sri Lanka.

There are Hindu shrines that are being preserved as well as Buddhist and secular things, and it's the kind of thing that the Sri Lankans can take great pride in.

This has been something that has been both a developmental as well as a cultural project insofar there are old agricultural settlements that are being restored, and so on.

PAK ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Harrison, what do you think the Pakistanis would do if we terminated our military assistance program to them in terms of the role they have been playing in the resistance in Afghanistan?

Do you think they would continue to view the resistance sympathetically and to, in effect, provide sanctuaries and support; or would they then come to the conclusion they had no alternative but to try to wind this down as quickly as possible?

Mr. HARRISON. If we were to continue large-scale economic assistance, bilateral and multilateral, I don't believe it would alter the basic situation that you describe.

Pakistan started its cooperation with the United States, and with Saudi Arabia, and with Egypt before they were able to get us to agree to the F-16's when Under Secretary Buckley went out there in 1981.

They make a great point of the fact that they weren't bought; they did it as good Islamic neighbors of the Afghans; and I think that the deeper factors that affect whether Pakistan will continue to serve as a conduit have to do with the dangers of Soviet retaliation to which Pakistan is exposed.

So I think this is a phony issue. The Saudi Arabian connection, above all, would preserve the continued use of Pakistan as long as, in a general sense, they felt it was a safe thing to do.

COMMUNAL TENSIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you, finally: We clearly have an interest in facilitating and in preserving the territorial integrity and communal tranquility of India, and in that sense the development of Sikh-Hindu tensions is a serious cause of concern as well as the developments in the Punjab and Assam.

Is there anything you think we can do, or should do, particularly in the context of this foreign aid bill, to facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity of India and the establishment of better communal relations between the various elements of the country?

Mr. HARRISON. I don't want you to think I'm Johnny One Note, but the territorial integrity of India and of Pakistan would both be stabilized by the type of more detached military aid posture I have suggested, because all these things interact.

The Indians perceive a Pakistan hand and even an American hand behind the Sikh problem, whether correctly or not. This is something we could go into.